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Abstract 
This chapter reviews empirical and theoretical results concerning knowledge of causal 
mechanisms—beliefs about how and why events are causally linked. First, we review the effects 
of mechanism knowledge, showing that mechanism knowledge can trump other cues to causality 
(including covariation evidence and temporal cues) and structural constraints (the Markov 
condition), and that mechanisms play a key role in various forms of inductive inference. Second, 
we examine several theories of how mechanisms are mentally represented—as associations, 
forces or powers, icons, abstract placeholders, networks, or schemas—and the empirical 
evidence bearing on each theory. Finally, we describe ways that people acquire mechanism 
knowledge, discussing the contributions from statistical induction, testimony, reasoning, and 
perception. For each of these topics, we highlight key open questions for future research. 
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Introduction 
Our causal knowledge not only includes beliefs about which events are caused by other 
events, but also an understanding of how and why those events are related. For instance, when a 
soprano hits an extremely high note, the sound can break a wine glass due to the high frequency 
of the sound waves. Although people may not know the detailed mechanisms underlying this 
relationship (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002), people believe that some mechanism transmits a force 
from the cause to the effect (White, 1989). Likewise, people believe in causal mechanisms 
underlying interpersonal relations (see Hilton, this volume). When Romeo calls to the balcony, 
Juliet comes, and she does so because of her love. When Claudius murders the king, Hamlet 
seeks revenge, because Hamlet is filled with rage. We use mechanisms to reason about topics as 
grand as science (Koslowski, 1996) and morality (Cushman, 2008; see Lagnado & Gerstenberg, 
this volume); and domains as diverse as collision events (Gerstenberg & Tenenbaum, this 
volume; White, this volume) and psychopathology (Ahn, Kim, & Lebowitz, this volume). Causal 
mechanisms pervade our cognition through and through. 
 Indeed, when a person tries to determine the cause of an event, understanding the 
underlying causal mechanism appears to be the primary concern. For instance, when attempting 
to identify the cause of “John had an accident on Route 7 yesterday,” participants in Ahn, Kalish, 
Medin, and Gelman (1995) usually asked questions aimed at testing possible mechanisms (e.g., 
“Was John drunk” or “Was there a mechanical problem with the car?”) rather than which factor 
was responsible for the effect (e.g., “Was there something special about John?” or “Did other 
people also have a traffic accident last night?”). 
 In this chapter, we describe the state of current research on mechanism knowledge. After 
defining terms, we review the effects of mechanism knowledge. We summarize studies showing 
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(1) that mechanism knowledge can trump other important cues to causality, and (2) that 
mechanism knowledge is critical for inductive inference. Next, we examine how mechanisms 
might be mentally represented, and summarize the empirical evidence bearing on each of several 
approaches. We then turn to how mechanisms are learned, parsing the contributions from 
statistical induction, testimony, reasoning, and perception. For each of these broad topics, we 
discuss potential avenues of future research. 
What is a Causal Mechanism? 
 A causal mechanism is generally defined as a (i) system of physical parts or abstract 
variables that (ii) causally interact in systematically predictable ways so that their operation can 
be generalized to new situations (e.g., Glennan, 1996; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000). We 
use the term mechanism knowledge to refer to a mental representation of such a system. 
 Mechanism knowledge is critical in cognition because we use it to understand other 
causal relations (Ahn & Kalish, 2000). Thus, we are motivated to seek out the mechanisms that 
underlie a causal relationship. The mechanism underlying the relation “X caused Y” (e.g., a 
soprano’s singing caused a wine glass to break) will involve constructs other than X and Y (e.g., 
high frequency of the voice), but which can connect those events together. For this reason, 
mechanisms have a close relationship to explanations (Lombrozo, 2010, Lombrozo & Vasilyeva, 
this volume). For instance, the causal relation “Mary was talking on her cell phone and crashed 
into a truck” can be explained through its underlying mechanism, “Mary was distracted and 
didn’t see the red light.” However, because causal knowledge is organized hierarchically 
(Johnson & Keil, 2014; Simon, 1996), this entire causal system could be embedded into a larger 
system such that more specific events might act as mechanisms underlying more general events. 
That is, “Mary was talking on her cell phone and crashed into a truck” might be a mechanism 
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underlying “Mary’s driving caused a traffic accident,” which in turn might be a mechanism 
underlying “Mary caused delays on I-95,” and so on. Thus, mechanism knowledge is not merely 
a belief about what caused some event, but a belief about how or why that event was brought 
about by its cause, which can itself be explained in terms of another underlying mechanism, ad 
infinitum. Although we adopt this understanding of mechanism as a working definition, other 
factors such as the organization of memory appear to play a role in how mechanism knowledge 
is used and in what counts as a mechanism (Johnson & Ahn, 2015). We discuss some of these 
factors later in this chapter (see “Representing Mechanism Knowledge”). 
 The term ‘mechanism’ has also been used in several other ways in the literature, which 
are somewhat different from our use. First, the term ‘mechanistic explanation’ is used to refer to 
backward-looking explanations (e.g., the knife is sharp because Mark filed it), as opposed to 
forward-looking, teleological explanations (the knife is sharp because it is for cutting; Lombrozo, 
2010). However, this distinction does not map onto our sense of mechanism, because teleological 
explanations can often be recast in mechanistic terms, in terms of causally interacting variables 
(e.g., the knife is sharp because human agents wanted to fashion a sharp object, and forging a 
sharp piece of metal was the best way to accomplish this goal; Lombrozo & Carey, 2006).  
 Second, some have argued that our knowledge of mechanisms underlying two causally 
related events, say A and B, includes not only the belief that there is a system of causally related 
variables mediating the relationship between A and B (a ‘mechanism’ as defined in the current 
chapter), but also an assumption that a force or causal power is transmitted from A to B (Ahn & 
Kalish, 2000; White, 1989). This is an independent issue because knowledge about a system of 
causally interconnected parts does not have to involve the notion of causal power or force. In fact, 
many of studies reviewed in this chapter demonstrating effects of mechanism knowledge did not 
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test whether the assumptions of causal force are required to obtain such effects. In this chapter, 
we separate these two issues when defining mechanism knowledge. Thus, our discussion of the 
effects of mechanism knowledge does not take a position on the debate concerning causal force, 
and our discussions of how people represent and learn mechanisms do not beg the question 
against statistical theories. 
Using Mechanism Knowledge 
 A major purpose of high-level cognition is inductive inference—predicting the unknown 
from the known. Here, we argue that mechanism knowledge plays a critical role in people’s 
inductive capacities. We describe studies on how mechanism knowledge is used in a variety of 
inductive tasks, including causal inference, category formation, category-based induction, and 
probability judgment. 
Mechanisms and Causal Inference 
 David Hume (1977/1748) identified two cues as critical to identifying causal 
relationships—covariation (the cause and effect occurring on the same occasions more often than 
would be expected by chance) and temporal contiguity (the cause and effect occurring close 
together in time). Both of these factors have received considerable empirical attention in recent 
years, and it has become increasingly clear that neither of these cues acts alone, but rather in 
conjunction with prior knowledge of causal mechanisms. In this section, we first describe how 
mechanism knowledge influences the interpretation of covariation information. We then describe 
how mechanism knowledge can result in violations of the Causal Markov Condition, a key 
assumption to modern Bayesian approaches to causal inference. Finally, we review evidence that 
even the seemingly straightforward cue of temporal contiguity is influenced in a top-down 
manner by mechanism knowledge.  
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 Covariation. Scientists must test their hypotheses using statistical inference. To know 
whether a medical treatment really works, or a genetic mutation really has a certain effect, or a 
psychological principle really applies, one must test whether the cause and effect are statistically 
associated. This observation leads to the plausible conjecture that laypeople’s everyday causal 
reasoning also depends on an ability to test for covariation between cause and effect.  
 But consider the following (real) research finding from medical science (Focht, Spicer, & 
Fairchok, 2002): Placing duct tape over a wart made it disappear in 85% of the cases (compared 
to 60% of cases receiving more traditional cryotherapy). Despite the study’s experimental 
manipulation and statistically significant effect, people may still be doubtful that duct tape can 
remove warts because they cannot think of a plausible mechanism underlying the causal 
relationship. In fact, the researchers supplied a mechanism: the duct tape irritates the skin, which 
in turn stimulates an immune system response, which in turn wipes out the viral infection that 
had caused the wart in the first place. Given this mechanism information, people would be far 
likelier to believe this causal link. Thus, even statistically compelling covariation obtained 
through experimental manipulation may not be taken as evidence for a causal link in the absence 
of a plausible underlying mechanism. 
 However, in this example, it could be that the mechanism is supplying ‘covert’ 
covariation information—for example, the mechanism implies covariation between duct tape and 
irritation, irritation and immune response, and immune response and wart recovery, and could 
have thereby conveyed stronger covariation between duct tape and wart recovery. In that case, 
one might argue that there is nothing special about mechanism information other than conveying 
covariation. To empirically demonstrate that mechanism information bolsters causal inferences 
above and beyond the covariation implied by the mechanism, Ahn et al. (1995, Experiment 4) 
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asked a group of participants to rate the strength of the covariation implied by sentences like 
“John does not know how to drive” for “John had a traffic accident.” They then asked a new 
group of participants to make causal attributions for the effect (e.g., the accident), given either 
the mechanism (e.g., John does not know how to drive) or its equivalent covariation (e.g., John is 
much more likely to have a traffic accident than other people are), as rated by the first group of 
participants. Participants were much more inclined to attribute the accident to the target cause 
when given the underlying mechanism, showing that mechanism information has an effect that 
goes beyond covariation. 
 More generally, the interpretation of covariation data is strongly influenced by 
mechanism knowledge. For example, learning about a covariation between a cause and effect has 
a stronger effect on the judged probability of a causal relationship when there is a plausible 
mechanism underlying the cause and effect (e.g., severed break lines and a car accident) than 
when there is not (e.g., a flat tire and a car failing to start; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2000). 
Similarly, both scientists and laypeople are more likely to discount data inconsistent with an 
existing causal theory, relative to data consistent with the theory (Fugelsang, Stein, Green, & 
Dunbar, 2004). Finally, people are more likely to condition on a potential alternative cause when 
interpreting trial-by-trial contingency data, if they are told about the mechanism by which the 
alternative cause operates (Spellman, Price, & Logan, 2001). These effects show that not only 
does mechanism information do something beyond covariation, but that it even constrains the 
way that covariation is used. 
 Structural constraints. Patterns of covariation between variables can be combined into 
larger patterns of causal dependency, represented as Bayesian networks (Pearl, 2000; Rottman & 
Hastie, 2014; Rottman, this volume). For example, if a covariation is known to exist between 
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smoking cigarettes (A) and impairment of lung function (B), and another is known to exist 
between smoking cigarettes (A) and financial burden (C), this can be represented as a causal 
network with an arrow from A to B and an arrow from A to C (a common cause structure). But of 
course, all of these events also have causes and consequences—social pressure causes cigarette 
smoking, impairment of lung function causes less frequent exercise, financial burden causes 
marital stress; and so on, ad infinitum. If we had to take into account all of these variables to 
make predictions about any of them (say, B), then we would never be able to use causal 
knowledge to do anything. The world is replete with too much information for cognition without 
constraints. 
 The key computational constraint posited by Bayesian network theories of causation is 
the Causal Markov Condition (also known as ‘screening off’; Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & 
Scheines, 1993). This assumption allows the reasoner to ignore the vast majority of potential 
variables—to assume that the probability distribution of a given variable is independent of all 
other variables except its direct effects, conditional on its causes. For example, the Markov 
condition tells us, given the causal structure described above for smoking, that if we know that 
Lisa smokes (A), knowing about her lung function (B) doesn’t tell us anything about her potential 
financial burden (C), and vice versa. Because the Markov Condition is what allows reasoners to 
ignore irrelevant variables (here, we can predict B without knowing about C or any of the causes 
of A), it is crucial for inference on Bayesian networks. 
 Alas, people often violate the Markov Condition. Although there appear to be a number 
of factors at play in these violations, including essentialist (Rehder & Burnett, 2005) and 
associationist (Rehder, 2014) thinking, one critical factor is mechanism knowledge (Park & 
Sloman, 2013, 2014). In common cause structures such as the smoking example above (smoking 
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leading to lung impairment and financial burden) where each causal link relies on a different 
mechanism, people do tend to obey the Markov Condition. That is, when asked to judge the 
probability of lung impairment given that a person smokes, this judgment is the same as when 
asked to judge the probability of lung impairment given that a person smokes and has a financial 
burden. But when the links rely on the same mechanism (e.g., smoking leading to lung 
impairment and to blood vessel damage), people robustly violate the Markov condition. When 
asked to judge the probability of lung impairment given that a person smokes, this judgment is 
lower than when asked to judge the probability of lung impairment given that a person smokes 
and has blood vessel damage. 
 This effect is thought to occur because participants use mechanism information to 
elaborate on the causal structure, interpolating the underlying mechanism into the causal graph 
(Park & Sloman, 2013). So, when the link between A and B depends on a different mechanism 
than the link between A and C, the resulting structure would involve two branches emanating 
from A, namely AàM1àB and AàM2àC. In Lisa’s case, cellular damage might be the 
mechanism mediating smoking and lung impairment, but cigarette expenditures would be the 
mechanism mediating smoking and financial burden. Thus, knowing about C (Lisa’s financial 
burden) triggers an inference about M2 (cigarette expenditures), but this knowledge has no effect 
on B (lung impairment) given that A (smoking) is known—the Markov condition is respected. 
But when the link between A and B depends on the same mechanism as the link between A and 
C, the resulting structure would be a link from A to M1, and then from M1 to B and to C—so, in 
effect, the mechanism M1 is the common cause, rather than A. That is, cellular damage might be 
the mechanism mediating the relationship between smoking and lung impairment and the 
relationship between smoking and blood vessel damage. Thus, knowing about C (blood vessel 
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damage) triggers an inference about M1 (cellular damage), and this knowledge has an effect on B 
(lung impairment) even if A (smoking) is known. Mechanism knowledge therefore not only 
affects the interpretation of covariation information, but also the very computational principles 
used to make inferences over systems of variables. 
 Temporal cues. According to the principle of temporal contiguity, two events are more 
likely to be causally connected if they occur close together in time. This idea has considerable 
empirical support (e.g., Lagnado & Sloman, 2006; Michotte, 1963/1946), and at least in some 
contexts, temporal contiguity appears to be used more readily than covariation in learning causal 
relations (Rottman & Keil, 2012; White, 2006). The use of temporal contiguity was long taken as 
a triumph for associationist theories of causal inference (Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989), 
because longer temporal delays are associated with weaker associations in associationist learning 
models. 
 Yet, people’s use of temporal cues appears to be more nuanced. People are able to 
associate causes and effects that are very distant in time (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). For 
example, a long temporal gap intervenes between sex and birth, between smoking and cancer, 
between work and paycheck, and between murder and prison. Why is it that the long temporal 
gaps between these events do not prevent us from noticing these causal links?  
 A series of papers by Buehner and colleagues documented top-down influences of causal 
knowledge on the use temporal contiguity (see Buehner, this volume). When participants expect 
a delay between cause and effect, longer delays have a markedly smaller deleterious effect on 
causal inference (Buehner & May, 2002, 2003), suggesting some knowledge mediation. In fact, 
when temporal delay is de-confounded with contingency, the effect of temporal delay can be 
eliminated altogether by instructions that induce the expectation of delay (Buehner & May, 
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2004). Most dramatically, some experiments used unseen physical causal mechanisms, which 
participants would believe to take a relatively short time to operate (a ball rolling down a steep 
ramp, hidden from view) or a long time to operate (a ball rolling down a shallow ramp). Under 
such circumstances, causal judgments were facilitated by longer delays between cause and 
effect, when the mechanism was one which would take a relatively long time to operate 
(Buehner & McGregor, 2006). Although older (9- to 10-year-old) children can integrate such 
mechanism cues with temporal information, younger (4- to 8-year-old) children continued to be 
swayed by temporal contiguity, suggesting that the relative priority of causal cues undergoes 
development (Schlottmann, 1999). Thus, when people can apply a mechanism to a putative 
causal relationship, they adjust their expectations about temporal delay so as to fit their 
knowledge of that mechanism. 
Mechanisms and Induction 
 The raison d’être for high-level cognition in general, and for causal inference in 
particular, is to infer the unknown from the known—to make predictions that will usefully serve 
the organism through inductive inference (Murphy, 2002; Rehder, this volume a, b). In this 
section, we give several examples of ways that mechanism knowledge is critical to inductive 
inference. 
 Categories are a prototypical cognitive structure that exists to support inductive inference. 
We group together entities with similar known properties, because those entities are likely to also 
share similar unknown properties (Murphy, 2002). Mechanism knowledge influences which 
categories we use. In a study by Hagmayer, Meder, von Sydow, and Waldmann (2011), 
participants learned the contingency between molecules and cell death. Molecules varied in size 
(large or small) and color (white or grey). While large white (11) molecules always led to cell 
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death and small grey (00) molecules never did, small white (01) and large grey (10) ones led to 
cell death 50% of the time. That is, 01 and 10 were equally predictive of cell death. However, 
prior to this contingency learning, some participants learned that molecule color was caused by a 
genetic mutation. Participants used this prior causal history to categorize small white molecules 
(01) with large white (11) molecules, which always resulted in cell death. Consequently, these 
participants judged that small white molecules (01) were much more likely to result in cell death 
than large grey molecules (10), even though they observed both probabilities to be 50%. The 
opposite pattern was obtained when participants learned that genetic mutation caused molecules 
to be large.  
Critically, this effect of prior categorization on subsequent causal learning depended on 
the type of underlying mechanism. Note that most people would agree that genetic mutations 
affect deeper features of molecules, which not only affects surface features such as color of 
molecules, but also can affect likelihood of cell death. Thus, the initial category learning based 
on the cover story involving genetic mutations provided a mechanism, which could affect later 
causal judgments involving cell death. In a subsequent experiment, however, the cover story 
used for category learning provided an incoherent mechanism. Participants learned that the 
variations in color (or size) were due to atmospheric pressure, which would be viewed as 
affecting only the surface features. Despite identical learning situations, participants provided 
with mechanism information that were relevant only to surface features did not distinguish 
between 10 and 01 in their causal judgments; their judgments stayed close to 50%. Thus, 
Hagmayer et al. (2011) showed that prior learning of categorization affects subsequent causal 
judgments only when the categorization involves mechanisms that would be relevant to the 
content of the causal judgments (see also Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2006 for related results). 
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More generally, people are likely to induce and use categories that are coherent (Murphy 
& Allopenna, 1994; Rehder & Hastie, 2004; Rehder & Ross, 2001). A category is coherent to the 
extent that its features ‘go together’, given the reasoner’s prior causal theories (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985). For example, “lives in water, eats fish, has many offspring, and is small” is a 
coherent category, because one can think of a causal mechanism that unifies these features, 
supplying the necessary mechanism knowledge; in contrast, “lives in water, eats wheat, has a flat 
end, and is used for stabbing bugs” is an incoherent category because it is difficult to supply 
mechanisms that could unify these features in a single causal theory (Murphy & Wisniewski, 
1989). Categories based on a coherent mechanism are easier to learn (Murphy, 2002), more 
likely to support the extension of properties to new members (Rehder & Hastie, 2004), and 
require fewer members possessing a given property to do so (Patalano & Ross, 2007). 
 Mechanism knowledge also influences category-based induction, or the likelihood of 
extending features from one category to another (see Heit, 2000 for a review). If the mechanism 
explaining why the premise category has a property is the same as the mechanism explaining 
why the conclusion category might have the property, then participants tend to rate the 
conclusion category as very likely having that property (Sloman, 1994). For example, 
participants found the following argument highly convincing: 
 Hyundais have tariffs applied to them; therefore, 
 Porsches have tariffs applied to them. 
That is, the reason that Hyundais have tariffs applied to them is because they are foreign cars, 
which would also explain why Porsches have tariffs applied to them. So, the premise in this case 
strongly supports the conclusion. In contrast, one may discount the likelihood of a conclusion 
when the premise and conclusion rely on different mechanisms, such as: 
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 Hyundais are usually purchased by people 25 years old and younger; therefore, 
 Porsches are usually purchased by people 25 years old and younger. 
In this case, the reason that Hyundais are purchased by young people (that Hyundais are 
inexpensive and young people do not have good credit) does not apply to Porsches (which might 
be purchased by young people because young people like fast cars). Because the premise 
introduces an alternative explanation for the property, people tend to rate the probability of the 
conclusion about Porsches lower when the premise about Hyundais is given, compared to when 
it is not given—an instance of the discounting or explaining-away effect (Kelley, 1973). These 
results show that mechanism knowledge can moderate the likelihood of accepting an explanation 
in the presence of another explanation.  
Ahn and Bailenson (1996) further examined the role of mechanism knowledge in the 
discounting and conjunction effects. In the discounting effect (Kelley, 1973), people rate the 
probability P(B) of one explanation higher than its conditional probability given another 
competing explanation, P(B|A). In the conjunction effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), people 
rate the probability of a conjunctive explanation, P(A&B), higher than its individual constituents 
such as P(A). The two effects may appear contradictory because the discounting effect seems to 
imply that one explanation is better than two, whereas the conjunction effect seems to imply that 
two explanations are better than one. Yet, Ahn and Bailenson (1996) showed that both 
phenomena turn on mechanism-based reasoning, and can occur simultaneously with identical 
events. For example, consider the task of explaining why Kim had a traffic accident. Further 
suppose that a reasoner learns that Kim is nearsighted. Given this explanation, a reasoner can 
imagine Kim having a traffic accident due to her nearsightedness. Note that to accept this 
explanation, one has to imagine that Kim’s nearsightedness is severe enough to cause a traffic 
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accident even under normal circumstances. Once such a mechanism is established, another 
explanation, “There was a severe storm,” would be seen as less likely because Kim’s 
nearsightedness is already a sufficient cause for a traffic accident. Thus, the second cause would 
be discounted. However, consider a different situation where both explanations are presented as 
being tentative and to be evaluated simultaneously. Thus, one is to judge the likelihood that Kim 
had a traffic accident because she is nearsighted and there was a severe storm. In this case, a 
reasoner can portray a slightly different, yet coherent mechanism where Kim’s (somewhat) poor 
vision coupled with poor visibility caused by a storm would have led to a traffic accident. Due to 
this coherent mechanism, the reasoner would be willing to accept the conjunctive explanation as 
highly likely—even as more likely than either of its conjuncts individually. That is, the 
discounting effect occurs because a reasoner settles in on a mechanism that excludes a second 
explanation, whereas the conjunction effect occurs because a reasoner can construct a coherent 
mechanism that can incorporate both explanations.  
In addition to demonstrating simultaneous conjunction and discounting effects, Ahn and 
Bailenson (1996) further showed that these effects do not occur when explanations are purely 
covariation-based—that is, when the explanations indicate positive covariation between a 
potential cause and effect without suggesting any underlying mechanism mediating their 
relationship. For instance, the explanations “Kim is more likely to have traffic accidents than 
other people are” and “traffic accidents were more likely to occur last night than on other nights” 
resulted in neither conjunction nor discounting effects. This pattern of results indicates that both 
discounting and conjunction effects are species of mechanism-based reasoning. 
Open Questions 
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These studies demonstrate a variety of ways that mechanism knowledge pervades our 
inductive capacities, but mechanism knowledge could affect induction in yet other ways. Beyond 
covariation, structural constraints, and temporal cues, might other cues to causality be affected 
by the nature of the underlying mechanisms? For instance, might the results of interventions be 
interpreted differently given different mechanisms? Might mechanism knowledge modulate the 
relative importance of these various cues to causality? 
There are also open questions about how mechanisms are used in induction. Given the 
tight link between mechanisms and explanation, what role might mechanisms play in inference 
to the best explanation, or abductive inference (Lipton, 2004; Lombrozo, 2012)? To what extent 
do different sorts of inductive problems (Kemp & Jern, 2013) lend themselves more to 
mechanism-based versus probability-based causal reasoning (see also Lombrozo, 2010)? Are 
there individual differences in the use of mechanisms? For instance, given that mechanisms 
underlie surface events, could people who are more intolerant of ambiguity or more in need of 
cognitive closure be more motivated to seek them out? Could people who are high in creativity 
be more capable of generating them, and more affected by them as a result? Finally, although we 
could in principle keep on asking “why” questions perpetually, we eventually settle for a given 
level of detail as adequate. What determines this optimal level of mechanistic explanation? 
Representing Causal Mechanisms 
 In the previous section, we described several of the cognitive processes that use 
mechanism knowledge. Here, we ask how mechanism knowledge is mentally represented 
(Markman, 1999). That is, what information do we store about mechanisms, and how do 
different mechanisms relate to one another in memory? We consider six possible representational 
formats—associations, forces or powers, icons, abstract placeholders, networks, and schemas. 
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Associations 
 According to associationist theories of causality, learning about causal relationships is 
equivalent to learning associations between causes and effects, using domain-general learning 
mechanisms that are evolutionarily ancient and used in other areas of causation (Shanks, 1987; 
Le Pelley, Griffiths, & Beesley, this volume). Thus, causal relations (including mechanism 
knowledge) would be represented as an association between two classes of events, akin to the 
stored result of a statistical significance test, so that one event would lead to the expectation of 
the other. This view is theoretically economical, in that associative learning is well-established 
and well-understood in other domains and in animal models. Further, associative learning can 
explain many effects in trial-by-trial causal learning experiments, including effects of 
contingency (Shanks, 1987) and delay (Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989). 
 However, hard times have fallen on purely associative theories of causation. Because 
these theories generally do not distinguish between the role of cause and effect, they have 
difficulty accounting for asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic causal learning (Waldmann, 
2000; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). Further, these theories predict a monotonic decline in 
associative strength with a delay between cause and effect, yet this decline can be eliminated or 
even reversed with appropriate mechanism knowledge (Buehner & May, 2004; Buehner & 
McGregor, 2006). Although associative processes are likely to play some role in causal 
reasoning and learning (e.g., Rehder, 2014), causal learning appears to go beyond mere 
association.  
 There are also problems with associations as representations of mechanism knowledge. 
One straightforward way of representing mechanism knowledge using associations is to 
represent causal relations among sub-parts or intermediate steps between cause and effect using 
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associations. Thus, association between cause and effect would consist of associations between 
the cause and first intermediate step, the first intermediate step and second intermediate step, and 
so on, while the overall association between cause and effect remain the same. This approach to 
mechanisms may be able to account for some effects of mechanism knowledge described earlier. 
For example, to account for why people believe more strongly in a causal link given a plausible 
mechanism for observed covariation (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2000), an advocate of 
associationism can argue that the mechanism conveys additional associative strength. 
 However, other effects of mechanism knowledge described earlier seem more 
challenging to the associationist approach. Ahn et al. (1995; Experiment 4) equated the 
covariation or association conveyed by the mechanism statements and the covariation statements, 
but participants nonetheless gave stronger causal attributions given the mechanism statements 
than covariation statements. Likewise, it is unclear on the associationist approach why 
conjunction and discounting effects are not obtained given purely covariational statements (Ahn 
& Bailenson, 1996) or why mechanism knowledge influences which categories we induce, given 
identical learning data (Hagmayer et al., 2011). 
Forces and Powers 
 The associationist view contrasts most strongly with accounts of causal mechanisms in 
terms of forces (Talmy, 1988; Wolff, 2007) or powers (Harré & Madden, 1975; White, 1988, 
1989). The intuition behind these approaches is that causal relations correspond to the operation 
of physical laws, acting on physical objects (Aristotle, 1970; Harré & Madden, 1975) or through 
physical processes (Dowe, 2000; Salmon, 1984; see also Danks, this volume). For example, 
Dowe (2000) argued that causal relations occur when a conserved quantity, such as energy, is 
transferred from one entity to another. This idea is broadly consistent with demonstrations that 
 20 
people often identify visual collision events as causal or non-causal in ways concordant with the 
principles of Newtonian mechanics, such as conservation of momentum (Michotte, 1963/1946). 
Indeed, even young children seem to be sensitive to physical factors such as transmission in their 
causal reasoning (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Shultz, Fisher, Pratt, & Rulf, 1986). 
 The force dynamics theory (Talmy, 1988; Wolff, 2007; Wolff, this volume) fleshes out 
these intuitions by representing causal relations as combinations of physical forces, modeled as 
vectors. On this theory, the causal affector (the entity causing the event) and patient (the entity 
operated on by the agent) are both associated with force vectors, indicating the direction of the 
physical or metaphorical forces in operation. For example, in a causal interaction between a fan 
and a toy boat, the fan would be the affector and the toy boat would be the patient, and both 
entities would have a vector indicating the direction of their motion. These forces as well as any 
other forces in the environment would combine to yield a resultant vector; e.g., the boat hits an 
orange buoy. On Wolff’s (2007) theory, the affector causes a particular endstate to occur if (a) 
the patient initially does not have a tendency toward that endstate, but (b) the affector changes 
the patient’s tendency, and (c) the endstate is achieved. For instance, the fan caused the boat to 
hit the buoy because (a) the boat was not initially headed in that direction, but (b) the fan 
changed the boat’s course, so that (c) the boat hit the buoy. This sort of force analysis has been 
applied to several phenomena in causal reasoning, including semantic distinctions among causal 
vocabulary (cause, enable, prevent, despite; Wolff, 2007); the chaining of causal relations (e.g., 
A preventing B and B causing C; Barbey & Wolff, 2007); causation by omission (Wolff, Barbey, 
& Hausknecht, 2010); and direct versus indirect causation (Wolff, 2003).  
 A related physicalist approach is the causal powers theory (Harré & Madden, 1975; 
White, 1988, 1989). On this view, people conceptualize particulars (objects or persons) as 
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having dispositional causal properties, which operate under the appropriate releasing conditions. 
These properties can be either causal powers (capacities to bring about effects) or liabilities 
(capacities to undergo effects). For example, a hammer might strike a glass watch face, causing it 
to break (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). In this case, the hammer has a power to bring about 
breaking, and the glass has the liability to be broken. (See White, 2009b for a review of many 
studies consistent with the notion that causal relations involve transmission of properties among 
entities.) People then make causal predictions and inferences based on their knowledge of the 
causal powers and liabilities of familiar entities.  
 These physicalist theories capture a variety of intuitions and empirical results concerning 
causal thinking (see Waldmann & Mayrhofer, in press), and any complete theory of causal 
mechanisms is responsible for accounting for these phenomena. However, these theories are 
compatible with many different underlying representations. In the case of force dynamics, the 
vector representations are highly abstract and apply to any causal situation. That is, this theory 
does not posit representations for specific mechanisms in semantic memory, and therefore 
mechanism representations could take one of many formats. In the case of causal powers theory, 
the reasoner must represent properties of particular objects, which in combination could lead to 
representations of specific mechanisms. However, these property representations could 
potentially take several different representational formats, including icons and schemas (see 
below). Thus, although force and power theories certainly capture important aspects of causal 
reasoning, they do not provide a clear answer to the question of how mechanisms are mentally 
represented. 
Icons 
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 A related possibility is that people represent causal mechanisms in an iconic or image-
like format. For example, when using mechanism knowledge to think about how a physical 
device works, the reasoner might mentally simulate the operation of the machine using mental 
imagery. More generally, people might store mechanism knowledge in an iconic format 
isomorphic to the physical system (Barsalou, 1999)—a view that sits comfortably with the 
physicalist theories described above. (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001 propose a different, 
broadly iconic view of causal thinking based on mental models; see also Johnson-Laird & 
Khemlani, this volume.) 
 Forbus’s (1984) qualitative process theory is an artificial intelligence theory of this style 
of reasoning. Qualitative process theory is designed to solve problems such as whether a bathtub 
will overflow, given the rate of water flowing out the faucet, the rate of drainage, and the rate of 
evaporation. This theory is ‘qualitative’ in the sense that it compares quantities and stores the 
direction of change, but does not reason about exact quantities. In this way, it is supposed to be 
similar to how humans solve these problems. 
 However, even if qualitative process theory accurately characterizes human problem 
solving processes, it is unclear whether these processes rely on mental representations that are 
propositional or image-like; after all, qualitative process theory itself is implemented in a 
computer programming language, using propositional representations. Several experimental 
results have been taken to support image-like representations (see Hegarty, 2004 for a review). 
First, when solving problems about physical causal systems (such as diagrams of pulleys or 
gears), participants who think aloud are likely to make gestures preceding their verbal 
descriptions, suggesting that spatial reasoning underlies their verbalizations (Schwartz & Black, 
1996). Second, solving problems about physical causal systems (such as diagrams of pulleys or 
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gears) appears to rely on visual ability but not verbal ability. Performance on such problems is 
predicted by individual differences in spatial ability but not in verbal ability (Hegarty & Sims, 
1994), and dual-task studies reveal interference between mechanical reasoning and maintenance 
of a visual working memory load but not a verbal working memory load (Sims & Hegarty, 
1997). 
 It is an open question whether people run image-like mental simulations even when 
reasoning about causal processes that are less akin to physical systems, but some indirect support 
exists. For instance, asymmetries in cause-to-effect versus effect-to-cause reasoning suggest that 
people may use simulations. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showed that people rate the 
conditional probability of a daughter having blue eyes given that her mother has blue eyes to be 
higher than the conditional probability of a mother having blue eyes given that the daughter has 
blue eyes. If the base rates of mothers and daughters having blue eyes are equal, these 
probabilities should be the same, but people appear to err because they make higher judgments 
when probability ‘flows’ with the direction of causality (for similar findings, see Fernbach, 
Darlow, & Sloman, 2010, 2011; Medin, Coley, Storms, & Hayes, 2003; Pennington & Hastie, 
1988). While these results do not necessitate image-like representations, they do speak in favor 
of simulation processes, as forward simulations appear to be more easily ‘run’ than backward 
simulations, just as films with a conventional narrative structure are more readily understood 
than films like Memento in which the plot unfolds in reverse order. 
 However, other arguments and evidence suggest that these results may be better 
understood in terms of non-iconic representations. First, a number of researchers have argued 
that there are fundamental problems with iconic representations. Pylyshyn (1973) argues, for 
example, that if we store iconic representations and use them in the same way that we use visual 
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perception, then we need a separate representational system to interpret those icons, just as we 
do for vision. Rips (1984) criticizes mental simulation more generally, pointing out that the sort 
of mental simulation posited by AI systems in all but the simplest cases is likely to be beyond the 
cognitive capacity of human reasoners. Reasoning about turning gears is one thing, but 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) claim that people use mental simulation to assess the 
probabilities of enormously complex causal systems, such as geopolitical conflict. Clearly, the 
number and variety of causal mechanisms at play for such simulations is beyond the ken of even 
the most sophisticated computer algorithms, much less human agents. In Rips’s view, rule-based 
mechanisms are far more plausible candidates for physical causal reasoning. According to both 
Pylyshyn and Rips, then, the phenomenology of mental simulation may be epiphenomenal. 
 There is also empirical evidence at odds with iconic representations of mechanisms. For 
example, Hegarty (1992) gave participants diagrams of systems of pulleys, and asked them 
questions such as “if the rope is pulled, will pulley B turn clockwise or counterclockwise?” 
Response times were related to the number of components between the cause (here, the rope) and 
effect (pulley B). While this result is broadly consistent with the idea of mental simulation, it 
suggests that people simulate the system piecemeal rather than simultaneously (as one might 
expect for a mental image or ‘movie’). More problematically, participants seem to be self-
inconsistent when all parts are considered. In a study by Rips and Gentner (reported in Rips, 
1984), participants were told about a closed room containing a pan of water. They were asked 
about the relations between different physical variables (such as air temperature, evaporation 
rate, and air pressure)—precisely the sort of inferences that mental simulations (such as those 
proposed by qualitative process theory) are supposed to be used for. The researchers found that 
people not only answered these questions inconsistently with the laws of physics, but even made 
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intransitive inferences. That is, participants very frequently claimed that a variable X causes a 
change in variable Y, which in turn causes a change in variable Z, but that X does not cause a 
change in Z—an intransitive inference. Such responses should not be possible if people are 
qualitatively simulating the physical mechanisms at work: Even if their mechanism knowledge 
diverges from the laws of physics, it should at least be internally consistent. (Johnson and Ahn 
(2015) review several cases where causal intransitivity can be normative, but none of these cases 
appear to be relevant to the stimuli used in the Rips and Gentner study). These results are more 
consistent with a schema view of mechanism knowledge (see below). 
 In sum, while studies of physical causal reasoning provide further evidence that causal 
thinking and mechanism knowledge in particular are used widely across tasks, they do not seem 
to legislate strongly in favor of iconic representations of mechanism knowledge. These results 
do, however, provide constraints on what representations could be used for mechanism-based 
reasoning. 
Placeholders 
 A fourth representational candidate is a placeholder or reference pointer. On this view, 
people do not have elaborate knowledge about causal mechanisms underlying causal relations, 
but instead have a placeholder for a causal mechanism. That is, people would believe that every 
causal relation has an (unknown) causal mechanism, yet in most cases would not explicitly 
represent the content. (See Keil, 1989; Kripke, 1980; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Putnam, 1975 for 
the original ideas involving conceptual representations; and see Pearl, 2000 for a related, formal 
view.) 
 The strongest evidence for this position comes from metacognitive illusions, where 
people consistently overestimate their knowledge about causal systems (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). 
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In a demonstration of the illusion of explanatory depth (IOED), participants were asked to rate 
their mechanistic knowledge of how a complex but familiar artifact operates (such as a flush 
toilet). Participants were then instructed to explain in detail how that artifact operates. When 
asked to re-rate their mechanistic knowledge afterwards, ratings were sharply lower, indicating 
that the act of explaining brought into awareness the illusory nature of their mechanistic 
knowledge. Thus, people’s representations of causal mechanisms appear to differ from their 
metarepresentation—people’s representations of mechanisms are highly skeletal and 
impoverished, yet their metarepresentations point to much fuller knowledge. 
 Further, this illusion goes beyond general overconfidence. Although similar effects can 
be found in other complex causal domains (e.g., natural phenomena such as how tides occur), 
people’s knowledge is comparatively well-calibrated in non-causal domains, such as facts (e.g., 
the capital of England), procedures (e.g., how to bake chocolate chip cookies from scratch), and 
narratives (e.g., the plot of Good Will Hunting), although some (more modest) overconfidence 
can be found in these other domains too (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977). 
 Together, these results suggest that, at least in some cases, people do not store detailed 
representations of mechanisms in their heads, but rather some skeletal details together with a 
metarepresentational placeholder or ‘pointer’ to some unknown mechanism assumed to exist in 
the world. These impoverished representations, together with the robust illusions of their 
richness, are another reason to be suspicious of iconic representations of mechanism knowledge 
(see “Icons” above). To the extent that this is a plausible representational format because it feels 
introspectively right, we should be suspicious that this intuition may be a metacognitive illusion. 
 However, in addition to these metarepresentational pointers or placeholders, people 
clearly do have some skeletal representations of mechanisms. Many of the effects described in 
 27 
earlier sections depend on people having some understanding of the content of the underlying 
mechanisms (e.g., Ahn & Bailenson, 1996; Ahn et al., 1995; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2000). 
And although people’s mechanistic knowledge might be embarrassingly shallow for scientific 
phenomena and mechanical devices, it seems to be more complete for mundane phenomena. For 
instance, people often drink water after they exercise. Why? Because they become thirsty. 
Although the physiological details may elude most people, people surely understand this 
mechanism at a basic, skeletal level. If not as associations, causal powers, or icons, what format 
do these representations take? Below, we consider two possibilities for these skeletal 
representations—causal networks and schemas. 
Networks 
 The idea that causal mechanisms might be represented as networks has recently received 
much attention (e.g., Glymour & Cheng, 1998; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Pearl, 2000). 
According to this view, causal relationships are represented as links between variables in a 
directed graph, encoding the probabilistic relationships among the variables and the 
counterfactuals entailed by potential interventions (see Rottman, this volume for more details). 
For example, people know that exercising (X) causes a person to become thirsty (Y), which in 
turn causes a person to drink water (Z). The causal arrows expressed in the graph encode facts 
such as: (1) Exercising raises the probability that a person becomes thirsty (a probabilistic 
dependency); and (2) intervening to make a person exercise (or not exercise) will change the 
probability of thirst (a counterfactual dependency). The relationship between thirst (Y) and 
drinking water (Z) can be analyzed in a similar way. These two relationships can lead a reasoner 
to infer, transitively, a positive covariation between exercise (X) and drinking water (Z), and a 
counterfactual dependence between interventions on exercise and the probability of drinking 
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water (but see “Schemas” below for several normative reasons why causal chains can be 
intransitive). Similarly, the effects of drinking water will also have probabilistic and 
counterfactual relationships to exercise, as will the alternative causes of drinking water, and so 
on. These networks are used in artificial intelligence systems because they are economical and 
efficient ways of storing and reasoning about causal relationships (Pearl, 1988, 2000; Spirtes, 
Glymour, & Scheines, 1993). 
 If causal knowledge is represented in causal networks, then they could be reducible to the 
probabilistic dependencies and counterfactual entailments implied by the network. One 
proponent of this view is Pearl (1988), who argued that our knowledge is fundamentally about 
probabilities, and that causal relationships are merely shorthand for probabilistic relationships 
(though Pearl, 2000 argues for a different view; see “Open Questions” below). If causal relations 
are merely abbreviations of probabilistic relationships, we can define a mechanism for the causal 
relationship XàZ as a variable Y which, when conditioned on, makes the correlation between X 
and Z go to zero (Glymour & Cheng, 1998) so that the Markov condition is satisfied. That is, Y is 
a mechanism for XàZ if P(Z|X) > P(Z|~X), but P(Z|X,Y) = P(Z|~X,Y). The intuition here is the 
same as in mediation analysis in statistics—a variable Y is a full mechanism or mediator if it 
accounts for the entirety of the relationship between X and Z. As an example, Glymour and 
Cheng (p. 295) cite the following case (from Baumrind, 1983): 
The number of never-married persons in certain British villages is highly inversely 
correlated with the number of field mice in the surrounding meadows. [Marriage] was 
considered an established cause of field mice by the village elders until the mechanisms 
of transmission were finally surmised: Never-married persons bring with them a 
disproportionate number of cats. 
 
In this case, the number of cats (Y) would be a mechanism that mediates the relationship between 
marriage (X) and field mice (Z) because there is no longer a relationship between marriage and 
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field mice when marriage is held constant. In the next section, we discuss limitations of 
conceptualizing mechanisms this way after describing the schema format. 
Schemas 
 Finally, mechanism knowledge might be represented in the form of schemas—clusters of 
content-laden knowledge stored in long-term memory. Schemas are critical for inductive 
inference because they are general knowledge that can be used to instantiate many specific 
patterns (Bartlett, 1932; Schank & Abelson, 1977). For example, if Megan tells you about her ski 
trip, you can already fill in a great amount of the detail without her explicitly telling you—you 
can assume, for example, that there was a mountain, that the ground was snowy, that warm 
beverages were available in the lodge, and so on. Causal mechanisms could likewise be 
represented as clusters of knowledge about the underlying causal relations. 
 Like networks, schemas are a more skeletal representation and would not necessarily 
implicate image-like resources. Unlike networks, however, relationships between causally 
adjacent variables would not necessarily be stored together. This is because two causal 
relationships can be ‘accidentally’ united in a causal chain by sharing an event in common, yet 
not belong to the same schema. For example, we have a schema for sex causing pregnancy, and 
another schema for pregnancy causing nausea. But we may not have a schema for the 
relationship between sex and nausea. On the network view discussed above (Glymour & Cheng, 
1998), because these three events are related in a causal chain, pregnancy is a mechanism 
connecting sex and nausea. On the schema view, in contrast, sex and nausea might not even be 
seen as causally related. 
 To distinguish between networks and schemas, Johnson and Ahn (2015) tested people’s 
judgments about the transitivity of causal chains—the extent to which, given that A causes B and 
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B causes C, A is seen as a cause of C. According to the network view, the AàC relationship 
should be judged as highly causal to the extent that AàB and BàC are seen as highly causal. In 
contrast, the schema view implies that AàC would be judged as highly causal only if A and C 
belong to the same schema, even if AàB and BàC are strong. This is exactly what was found. 
For chains that were found in a preliminary experiment to be highly schematized (e.g., Carl 
studied, learned the material, and got a perfect score on the test), participants gave high causal 
ratings to AàB, BàC, and AàC (agreeing that Carl studying caused him to get a perfect score 
on the test). But for chains that were not schematized (e.g., Brad drank a glass of wine, fell 
asleep, and had a dream), participants gave high causal ratings for AàB and BàC, but not for 
AàC (denying that Brad’s glass of wine made him dream). Johnson and Ahn (2015) also ruled 
out several normative explanations for causal intransitivity (e.g., Hitchcock, 2001; Paul & Hall, 
2013). For example, causal chains can be normatively intransitive when the Markov condition is 
violated, but the Markov condition held for the intransitive chains. Similarly, chains can appear 
intransitive if one or both of the intermediate links (AàB or BàC) is probabilistically weak, 
because the overall relation (AàC) would then be very weak. But the transitive and intransitive 
chains were equated for intermediate link strength, so this explanation cannot be correct. 
 The lack of transitive inferences given unschematized causal chains is a natural 
consequence of the schema theory, but is difficult to square with the network theory. When 
assessing whether an event causes another, people often use a ‘narrative’ strategy, rejecting a 
causal relationship between two events if they cannot generate a story leading from the cause to 
the effect using their background knowledge (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Taleb, 2007). 
Hence, if people store AàB and BàC in separate schemas, they could not easily generate a path 
leading from A to C, resulting in intransitive judgments. The very point of the network 
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representation, however, is to allow people to make precisely such judgments—to represent, for 
example, the conditional independence between A and C given B, and the effects of potential 
interventions on A on downstream variables. Indeed, if the network view defines mechanisms in 
terms of such conditional independence relations, then it would require these variables to be 
linked together. Participants’ intransitive judgments, then, are incompatible with network 
representations. 
Open Questions 
 Because the issue of how causal knowledge is represented is a young research topic, we 
think it is fertile ground for further theoretical and empirical work. The greatest challenge 
appears to be understanding how mechanism knowledge can have all the representational 
properties that it does—it has schema-like properties (e.g., causally adjacent variables are not 
necessarily connected in a causal network; Johnson & Ahn, 2015), yet it also has association-like 
properties (e.g., causal reasoning sometimes violates probability theory in favor of associationist 
principles; Rehder, 2014), force-like properties (e.g., vector models capture aspects of causal 
reasoning; Wolff, 2007), icon-like properties (e.g., people have the phenomenology of visual 
simulation in solving mechanistic reasoning problems; Hegarty, 2004), placeholder-like 
properties (e.g., our metarepresentations are far richer than our representations of mechanisms; 
Rozenblit & Keil, 2002), and network-like properties (e.g., people are sometimes able to perform 
sophisticated probabilistic reasoning in accord with Bayesian networks; Gopnik et al., 2004). 
 One view is that Bayesian network theories will ultimately be able to encompass many of 
these representational properties (Danks, 2005). Although one version of the network theory 
equates mechanism knowledge with representing the causal graph (Glymour & Cheng, 1998), 
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other network-based theories might be more flexible (e.g., Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009). For 
example, Pearl (2000, p. xv–xvi) writes: 
In this tradition [of Pearl’s earlier book Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems 
(1988)], probabilistic relationships constitute the foundations of human knowledge, 
whereas causality simply provides useful ways of abbreviating and organizing intricate 
patterns of probabilistic relationships. Today, my view is quite different. I now take 
causal relationships to be the fundamental building blocks both of physical reality and of 
human understanding of that reality, and I regard probabilistic relationships as but the 
surface phenomena of the causal machinery that underlies and propels our understanding 
of the world. 
 
That is, our causal knowledge might be represented on two levels—at the level of causal graphs 
that represent probabilities and counterfactual entailments, and at a lower level that represents 
the operation of physical causal mechanisms. This view does not seem to capture all of the 
empirical evidence, as the results of Johnson and Ahn (2015) appear to challenge any theory that 
posits representations of causal networks without significant qualifications. Nonetheless, theories 
that combine multiple representational formats and explain the relations among them are needed 
to account for the diverse properties of mechanism knowledge. 
 Another largely open question is where the content of these representations comes from. 
For example, to the extent that mechanism knowledge is stored in a schema format, where do 
those schemas come from? That is, which event categories become clustered together in memory 
and which do not? Little is known about this, perhaps because schema formation is multiply 
determined, likely depending on factors such as spatial and temporal contiguity, frequency of 
encounter, and others. This problem is similar in spirit and difficulty to the problem of why we 
have the particular concepts that we do. Why do we have the concept of “emerald” but not the 
concept of “emeruby” (an emerald before 1997 or a ruby after 1997; Goodman, 1955)? Likewise, 
why do we have a schema for pregnancy and a schema for nausea, but not a schema that 
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combines the two? Although we describe prior research below on how people learn causal 
mechanisms, this existing work does not resolve the issue of where causal schemas come from. 
Learning Causal Mechanisms 
 In this section, we address how mechanism knowledge is learned. Associationist and 
network theories have usually emphasized learning from statistical induction (e.g., Glymour & 
Cheng, 1998). However, these theories can also accommodate the possibility that much or even 
most causal knowledge comes only indirectly from statistical induction. For example, some 
mechanisms could have been induced by our ancestors and passed to us by cultural evolution 
(and transmitted by testimony and education) or biological evolution (and transmitted by the 
selective advantage of our more causally enlightened ancestors). Although the bulk of empirical 
work on the acquisition of mechanisms focused on statistical induction, we also summarize what 
is known about three potential indirect learning mechanisms—testimony, reasoning, and 
perception. 
Direct Statistical Induction 
 If mechanisms are essentially patterns of covariation, as some theorists argue (Glymour 
& Cheng, 1998; Pearl, 1988), then the most direct way to learn about mechanisms is by inducing 
these patterns through statistical evidence. In fact, people are often able to estimate the 
probability of a causal relationship between two variables from contingency data (e.g., Griffiths 
& Tenenbaum, 2005; see also Rottman, this volume). However, mechanisms involve more than 
two variables, and the ability to learn causal relationships from contingency data largely vanishes 
when additional variables are introduced. For instance, in Steyvers, Wagenmakers, Blum, and 
Tenenbaum (2003), participants were trained to distinguish between three-variable common 
cause (i.e., A causes both B and C) and common effect (i.e., A and B both cause C). Although 
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performance was better than chance levels (50% accuracy), it was nonetheless quite poor—less 
than 70% accuracy on average even after 160 trials, with nearly half of participants performing 
no better than chance. (For similar results, see Hashem & Cooper, 1998 and White, 2006.) 
Although people are better able to learn from intervention than from mere observation (Kushnir 
& Gopnik, 2005; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005; see also Bramley, 
Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015; Coenen, Rehder, & Gureckis, 2015), they are still quite poor at 
learning multivariable causal structures. In Steyvers et al. (2003), learners allowed to intervene 
achieved only 33% accuracy at distinguishing among the 18 possible configurations of three 
variables (compared to 5.6% chance performance and 100% optimal performance). For the 
complex causal patterns at play in the real world, it seems unlikely that people rely on 
observational or interventional learning of multivariable networks as their primary strategy for 
acquiring mechanism knowledge. 
 Given that people have great difficulty learning a network of only 3 variables when 
presented simultaneously, a second potential learning strategy is piecemeal learning of causal 
networks. That is, instead of learning relations among multiple variables at once, people may 
first acquire causal relationships between two variables, and then combine them into larger 
networks (Ahn & Dennis, 2000; Fernbach & Sloman, 2009). For example, Baetu and Baker 
(2009) found that people who learned a contingency between A and B and between B and C 
inferred an appropriate contingency between A and C, suggesting that participants had used the 
principle of causal transitivity to combine inferences about these disparate links (for similar 
findings, see Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; von Sydow, Meder, & Hagmayer, 2009).1 
                                                
1 Although this result may appear to conflict with the results of Johnson and Ahn (2015), which 
demonstrated causal intransitivity in some causal chains, the two sets of findings can be 
reconciled, because Johnson and Ahn (2015) used familiar stimuli for which people could expect 
 35 
Although more work will be necessary to test the boundary conditions on piecemeal construction 
of causal networks (e.g., Johnson & Ahn, 2015), this appears to be a more promising strategy for 
acquiring knowledge of complex causal mechanisms. 
 Learning networks of causal relations from contingency data is challenging, whether 
from observations or from interventions, likely as a result of our computational limits. Hence, it 
seems unlikely that we induce all of our mechanism knowledge from statistical learning (see Ahn 
& Kalish, 2000), even if direct statistical induction plays some role. Where might these other 
beliefs about causal mechanisms come from? 
Indirect Sources of Mechanism Knowledge 
 Much of our mechanism knowledge appears to come not directly from induction over 
observations, but from other sources, such as testimony from other people or explicit education, 
reasoning from other beliefs, and perhaps perception. Although relatively little work has 
addressed the roles of these sources in acquiring mechanism knowledge in particular, each has 
been implicated in causal learning more generally. 
 Testimony and cultural evolution. Much of our mechanism knowledge seems to come 
from family members and peers, from experts, and from formal and informal education. Children 
are famously curious, and renowned for their enthusiasm for asking series of “why” questions 
that probe for underlying mechanisms. Although parents are an important resource in children’s 
learning (e.g., Callanan & Oakes, 1992), parents’ knowledge is necessarily limited by their 
expertise. However, children’s (and adults’) ability to seek out and learn from experts puts them 
                                                                                                                                                       
to have schematized knowledge, whereas Baetu and Baker (2009) used novel stimuli. In 
reasoning about novel stimuli, people would not use a narrative strategy (i.e., trying to think of a 
story connecting the causal events), but would instead use a statistical (Baetu & Baker, 2009) or 
rule-based strategy (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). The lack of schematized knowledge 
would not block transitive inferences under these reasoning strategies.   
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in a position to acquire mechanism knowledge when unavailable from more immediate 
informants (Mills, 2013; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013; Sperber et al., 2010). In particular, children 
have an understanding of how knowledge is distributed across experts (Lutz & Keil, 2002) and 
which causal systems are sufficiently rich or “causally dense” that they would have experts 
(Keil, 2010). 
 Further, the growth of mechanism knowledge not only over ontogeny but over history 
points to powerful mechanisms of cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Dawkins, 1976). 
Successive generations generate new scientific knowledge and transmit a subset of that 
knowledge to the public and to other scientists. Most experimental and computational work in 
cultural evolution has focused on how messages are shaped over subsequent generations 
(Bartlett, 1932; Griffiths, Kalish, & Lewandowsky, 2008), how languages evolve (Nowak, 
Komarova, & Niyogi, 2001), or how beliefs and rituals are propagated (Boyer, 2001). Less is 
known from a formal or experimental perspective about how cultural evolution impacts the 
adoption of scientific ideas (but see Kuhn, 1962). Nonetheless, it is clear that the succession of 
ideas over human history are guided in large part by a combination of scientific scrutiny and 
cultural selection, and that these forces therefore contribute to the mechanism knowledge that 
individual cognizers bring to bear on the world. 
 Reasoning. Imagine you have done the hard work of understanding the mechanisms 
underlying the circulatory system of elephants—perhaps by conducting observations and 
experiments, or through explicit education. It would be sad indeed if this hard-won mechanism 
knowledge were restricted to causal reasoning about elephants. What about specific kinds of 
elephants? Mammals in general? Particular mammals like zebras? 
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 Beliefs are not informational islands. Rather, we can use reasoning to extend knowledge 
from one domain to another. We can use deductive reasoning to extend our general knowledge 
about elephant circulation ‘forwards’ to African elephant circulation (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991; Rips, 1994; Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2008; see Oaksford & Chater, this volume and 
Over, this volume). We can use analogical reasoning to extend our knowledge of elephant 
circulation ‘sideways’ to similar organisms like zebras (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Hofstadter, 
2014; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997; see Holyoak & Lee, this volume). And we can use abductive 
reasoning to extend our knowledge ‘backwards’ to mammals (Keil, 2006; Lipton, 2004; 
Lombrozo, 2012; see Lombrozo & Vasilyeva, this volume and Meder & Mayrhofer, this 
volume); indeed, Ahn and Kalish (2000) suggested that abductive reasoning is a particularly 
important process underlying mechanistic causal reasoning. Although these reasoning strategies 
do not always lead to veridical beliefs (e.g., Lipton, 2004; Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2008), 
they seem to do well often enough that they can be productive sources of hypotheses about 
causal mechanisms, and they may be accurate enough to support causal inference in many 
realistic circumstances without exceeding our cognitive limits. 
 Perception. Intuitively, we sometimes seem to learn mechanisms from simply watching 
those mechanisms operate in the world (see White, this volume). For example, you might 
observe a bicycle in operation, and draw conclusions about the underlying mechanisms from 
these direct observations. Indeed, much evidence supports the possibility that people can visually 
perceive individual causal relations (Michotte, 1963/1946; Rolfs, Dambacher, & Cavanagh, 
2013; see White, 2009a for a review and Rips, 2011 for a contrary view). Haptic experiences 
may also play a role in identifying causal relations (White, 2012, 2014; Wolff & Shepard, 2013). 
Just as people seem to learn about individual causal relationships from statistical information and 
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combine them together into more detailed mechanism representations (Ahn & Dennis, 2000; 
Fernbach & Sloman, 2009), people may likewise be able to learn about individual causal events 
from visual experience, and combine these into larger mechanism representations. 
 However, we should be cautious in assuming that we rely strongly on perceptual learning 
for acquiring mechanism knowledge, because little work has addressed this question directly and 
people are susceptible to metacognitive illusions (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). For example, Lawson 
(2006) found that people have poor understanding of how bicycles work, and when asked to 
depict a bicycle from memory, often draw structures that would be impossible to operate (e.g., 
because the frame would prevent the wheels from turning). These errors were found even for 
bicycle experts and people with a physical bicycle in front of them while completing the task 
(see also Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). Hence, in many cases, what appears to be a mechanism 
understood through direct perceptual means is in fact something far more schematic and 
incomplete, derived from long-term memory. 
Open Questions 
 One major open question concerns the balance among these direct and indirect sources. 
Do we acquire many of our mechanism beliefs through statistical induction, despite our difficulty 
with learning networks of variables, or is the majority of our causal knowledge derived from 
other indirect sources? When we combine individual causal relations into mechanism 
representations, do we do so only with relations learned statistically, or are we also able to 
combine disparate relations learned through testimony, reasoning, or perception? To what extent 
can these causal maps combine relations learned through different strategies? Put differently, do 
these learning strategies all produce mechanism representations of the same format, or do they 
contribute different sorts of representations that may be difficult to combine into a larger picture? 
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 Another challenge for future research will be investigating the extent to which these 
sources contribute not only to learning general causal knowledge (learning that A causes B) but 
also mechanism knowledge (learning why A causes B). The majority of the evidence summarized 
above concerns only general causal knowledge, so the contribution of these indirect sources to 
acquiring mechanism knowledge should be addressed empirically. 
 Finally, might some mechanism knowledge be conveyed through the generations not only 
through cultural evolution, but also through biological evolution? It is controversial to what 
extent we have innate knowledge (e.g., Carey, 2009; Elman et al., 1996), and less clear still to 
what extent we have innate knowledge of causal mechanisms. Nonetheless, we may be born with 
some highly schematic, skeletal representations of mechanisms. For example, 4-month-old 
infants appear to understand the fundamental explanatory principles of physics (e.g., Spelke, 
Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992), including physical causality (Leslie & Keeble, 
1987); belief-desire psychology emerges in a schematic form by 12 months (Gergely & Csibra, 
2003); and young children use the principles of essentialism (Keil, 1989), vitalism (Inagaki & 
Hatano, 2004), and inherence (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014) to understand the behavior of living 
things. These rudimentary explanatory patterns may provide candidate mechanisms underlying 
many more specific causal relationships observed in the world. To the extent that these patterns 
are innate, we might be born with some highly skeletal understanding of causal mechanisms that 
can underlie later learning.  
Conclusion 
 The chapters in this volume demonstrate the depth to which causality pervades our 
thinking. In this chapter, we have argued further that knowledge of causal mechanisms pervades 
our causal understanding. First, when deciding whether a relationship is causal, mechanism 
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knowledge can trump other cues to causality. It provides evidence over and above covariation, 
and a mechanism can even change the interpretation of new covariation information; it can result 
in violations of the Causal Markov Condition—a critical assumption for statistical reasoning via 
Bayesian networks; and it can alter expectations about temporal delays, moderating the effect of 
temporal proximity on causal judgment. Second, mechanism knowledge is crucial to inductive 
inference. It affects which categories are used and induced; how strongly an exemplar’s features 
are projected onto other exemplars; how likely we are to extend a property from one category to 
another; and how we make category-based probability judgments, producing discounting and 
conjunction effects. 
 Mechanism knowledge is also key to how causal relations are mentally represented. 
Several representational formats have been proposed—associations, forces or powers, icons, 
placeholders, networks, and schemas. Although there are likely to be elements of all of these 
formats in our mechanism knowledge, two positive empirical conclusions are clear: First, 
people’s metarepresentations of causal knowledge are far richer than their actual causal 
knowledge, suggesting that our representations include abstract placeholders or ‘pointers’ to real-
world referents that are not stored in the head. Second, however, people do represent some 
mechanism content, and this content appears to often take the form of causal schemas. Future 
theoretical and empirical work should address how the various properties of mechanism 
knowledge can be understood in a single framework. 
 Mechanisms may be acquired in part through statistical induction. However, because 
people are poor at learning networks of three or more variables by induction, it is more likely 
that people learn causal relations individually and assemble them piecemeal into larger networks. 
People also seem to use other learning strategies for acquiring mechanism knowledge, such as 
 41 
testimony, reasoning, and perhaps perception. How these strategies interact, and whether they 
produce different sorts of representations, are open questions. 
 Although we would not claim that all reasoning about causation is reasoning about 
mechanisms, mechanisms are central to many of our nearest and dearest inferential processes. 
Hence, understanding the representation and acquisition of mechanism knowledge can help to 
cut to the core of causal thinking, and much of the cognition that it makes possible. 
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